I'm currently spending a significant amount of my time on fraud investigations at work. I've written some code which collates logs and transactional data then mashes it up to find patterns. It is accurately predicting the majority of the fraud. (I keep telling my boss I want to work on commission but so far I'm stuck with a salary). Although this is a huge leap forward from the position before I was involved, I'd like to reduce the remaining losses further.
My program relies heavily on IP addresses to identify individual client devices while the groups carrying out the fraud are mostly using mobile dongles or proxying via vulnerable webservers in an effort to obscure their identity. So I've been looking at alternative methods for identifying whom is at the far end of the wire.
(I should point out that in order to carry out a transaction on our system, the users must authenticate themselves therefore anonymity is not an issue for our legitimate users).
While
evercookie looks to be ideal for our purposes, it's high profile means that our attackers may be specifically on the lookout for this - as well as the risk that it may be detected as malware by legitimate users with the right software. And despite the fact that our legitimate users have a thouroughly verified identity, I think undermining the security of their computers to be a step too far. The methods described in the
Panopticlick project seem to be a more appropriate so I've been looking at these in some detail.
Which User Agent?
The obvious starting point is the user-agent. From the data I have already, the common user-agent suggests that I can link transactions from different IP addresses. They do change over time. Google Chrome is particularly troublesome - it appears to upgrade itself on the fly - even mid-session! And of course most browsers have tools for easily switching the user-agent reported in Javascript and in HTTP requests.
The only people publishing stats regarding faked user agents are, not surprisingly, people developing code in this area - and their sites are more likely to be visitied by technically sophisticated users, deliberately trying to test out the detection. I think it's reasonable to surmise that faking of user agents in the wild is relatively rare - so if I can reliably detect a faked user agent, knowing what the real user agent is does not help significantly with generating a unique fingerprint. A further consideration, is that even were this possible, sending the real user-agent back serverside increases the visibility of the fingerprinting process to an attacker.
It's worth noting that the navigator object has other properties / methods indicating the identity of the browser. Notably
appCodeName
appName
appVersion
platform
With the user-agent switcher on Safari, navigator.userAgent and navigator.appVersion matches the selected user agent in the switcher, and this is what is sent in the request. appName and appCodeName are always Netscape and Mozilla resp. However navigator.platform always reports win32, regardless.
With a Firefox
user agent switcher, all the properties were changed.
Pedro Laguna provides a method for detecting the browser type by using
the text of javascript exception messages. I'd previously found such an approach to be very effective when fingprinting SMTP servers, so I was optimistic that this could be used to detect most instances of UA faking. However although it works up to a point, it can produce nasty security warnings in some browsers and I had trouble accurately detecting MSIE v6 and Google Chrome. YMMV.
Robert Accettura has a nice writeup of the detection implemented in jquery, Prototype and
Yui which parse the user agent string while Mootols uses feature detection. The Mootools implementation only differentiates between different suppliers of browsers - not between versions of browser from the same supplier.
A paper by
Mowery, Bogonerif, Yilek and Shacham describes a methodology for identifying browsers based on the javascript execution characterisitics. However they don't publish the exact code they used for their fingerprinting. I'm also sceptical of how effective the resolution would be on a wide variety of client machines running other applications concurrently - and without access to their code it'd be a lot of effort to test myself.
The engimatic
Norbert proposes variations in Javascript parsing metrics (via arguments.callee.toString().length ) - this led me to some more specific articles on the subject, notably those by Bojan Zdrnja on SANS
(1)(2)
Again it differentiates between parsing engines families rather than individual versions. Using a test script I got the following values:
115 - Safari 3
116 - Firefox 10
187 - Chrome 5, MSIE 6
Another approach is to simply look at what functionality is exposed by the javascript API. In general, developers usually add features - they rarely get retired. However this seems to be a fairly effective approach for detecting specific versions of browsers. These pages
have some more details on feature detection.
(3)(4)(5)
So based on my research I used feature detection as the primary driver for my user agent checker, but did have to fall back on the Javascript parsing metrics to apply Firefox specific tests. My script includes the parser check, screen size / depth, language as well as the availability of selected APIs to contribute to the fingerprint.
Fonts
Several of the published documents / code make reference to fonts supplied as a good indicator of variability. Most use Flash or Java to get a list of the fonts. Interestingly both seem to provide an unsorted list - so the ordering is determined by where they appear on the disk - adding more unique behaviour. Not having a development toolkit for either, meant I had limited scope for testing this myself - but I did come across
some code written by Lalit Patel . Lalit renders a fixed string using a degrading font-selector using different degraded fonts - if the size of the rendered string is the same, then the system must have the prefered font available -
neato!
Taking this one step further, if I have a list of fonts to check for, then I can build up a list of what's available. Of course if I look for, say, Arial on a MS Windows platform, Helvetica on MacOS or Vera on Linux it's not going to tell me very much - but on
www.codestyle.org I found lists showing the less common fonts. While looking for the
most common fonts doesn't add a lot of variability, looking for
very rare fonts adds code with little yield - so I created a list of the fonts lying in between these extremes for my code.
Plugins
On Firefox and webkit based browsers, navigator.plugins provides names and versions of the browser plugins (Adobe Acrobat, Flash, Java etc). Iterating through this is simple. Although MSIE has a plugins property in navigator it is not populated. In order to get information about a plugin you need to create an instance of it. And there is no standard API in ActiveX objects to get version information.
Eric Gerds has written some code for getting information about common plugins, however he doesn't reveal much about his methods - and trying to reverse engineer the obfuscated javascript is a bit of a task.
On the builtfromsource blog (author does not seem to provide any identity information) there are
examples of how to detect/get version information from some of the more common ActiveX plugins.
While the Timezone Offset is available to javascript (e.g. +0100) the actual time zone (e.g. Europe/London) contains a lot more information; but the latter is not available to Javascript.
Phil Taylor reports that different Time zones with the same offset can have different dates on which daylight saving time is switched on. However his method does require a lot of computation on the browser - approx 15k date calculations. There is some scope for optimizing this though (e.g. only looking at last weeks of March and October).
Josh Fraser offers a rewritten
script for detecting both the timezone offset and whether DST applies for the current TZ .
Does it work?
I've mentioned I did some testing: I wrote a script using feature detection, arguments.callee.toString().length, font detection and plugin detection (i.e. specifically not using the user Agent string) and ran it on some computers at work.
Where I work the computers are all installed from standard builds. So far, I've got 23 fingerprints from 24 (supposedly identical) machines - i.e. I've only got 2 machines returning the same fingerprint.
I was concerned that instantiating the activeX objects would have an impact on performance and/or be otherwise visible to the user. On my test script, creating instances of Acrobat, Flash, Realplayer and MSWindows Media Player took 2-3 seconds - so not terribly intrusive. In one case, the user got a warning message regarding Acrobat (he'd not previously accessed any PDF files since the system had been installed, the other plugins did not produce any visible warnings). The time taken for the remainder of the javascript to run is negligible.
Where's my code? Sorry, don't want to make it
too easy for the bad guys to see what I'm doing. If you follow the links I've provided you'll get the same functionality with just a little cutting and pasting.
